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Abstract
This paper is an exposition of an experiment on revealed preferences, where
we posite a novel discrete binary choice model. To estimate this model, we
use general estimating equations or . This is a methodology originating
in biostatistics for estimating regression models with correlated data. In this
paper, we focus on the motivation for our approach, the logic and intuition
underlying our analysis and a summary of our findings. The missing technical
details, including proofs, are in the working paper by Bunn, et al (2013).
The experimental data is available from the corresponding author: don-
ald.brown@yale.edu. The recruiting poster and the informed consent form are
included as appendices to the section on Experimental Protocols.
JEL Classification: C23, C35, C91, D03
Keywords: Counterfactual outcomes, Odds ratios, Alternating logistic regression
1 Introduction
We propose and analyze a revealed preference experiment on fictive learning in choice
under uncertainty, where subjects are offered a sequence of binary choices between
risky and ambiguous binary lotteries. Subjects know the relative frequencies of risky
payoffs, but are ignorant of the relative frequencies of ambiguous payoffs. Inspired by
Ellsberg’s well known two-urn paradox (1961), where if the risky and ambiguous urn
have the same payoffs then optimistic subjects choose the ambiguous urn and pes-
simistic subjects choose the risky urn, Bracha and Brown (2012) introduced affective
utilities as representations of a subject’s optimism or pessimism in making binary
choices under uncertainty. We assume that subjects are endowed with random utility
functions, where they evaluate risky lotteries with expected utility and ambiguous
lotteries with affective utility. Subjects chose the risky lottery if its expected utility
exceeds the affective utility of the ambiguous lottery by some random threshold.
Each subject’s sequence of binary choices is divided into three phases: pre-
learning, learning and post-learning. In the learning phase, the payoffs of actual and
counterfactual choices are revealed to subjects. No payoffs are revealed to subjects
in the pre-learning and the post-learning phases. The subjects in our experiment are
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Yale undergraduates, randomly assigned to a control group or a treatment group. In
the treatment group, subjects are exposed to the factual and counterfactual payoffs of
lotteries in the learning phase, allowing subjects to estimate the relative frequencies
of ambiguous payoffs. In the control group, subjects are exposed to noisy factual
and counterfactual payoffs of ambiguous lotteries in the learning phase, where they
cannot estimate the relative frequencies of ambiguous payoffs.
Conditioning current choices under uncertainty on counterfactual payoffs of pre-
vious choices, i.e., fictive learning, is well documented in  studies of gambling
behavior in humans – see Lohrenz et al. (2007) and decision-making under uncer-
tainty in monkeys – see Hayden et al. (2009). Recently Boorman et al. (2011)
identified neural circuits for counterfactual payoffs and fictive learning. A common
practice in experimental studies of decision-making under uncertainty, such as the
 studies in Huettel et al. (2006) and Levy et al. (2009) is to posit a cross-
sectional model for the experimental data. Unfortunately, a cross-sectional analysis
ignores that each subject’s repeated binary responses are correlated. In fact, this is
the generic property of most revealed preference experiments in neuroeconomics.
Recently, Li et al. (2008) proposed the longitudinal analysis of neuroimaging data
with general estimating equations (), due to Liang and Zeger (1986) and Zeger
and Liang (1986). Li et al. argue that the existing statistical methods for analyzing
neuroimaging data are primarily developed for cross-sectional neuroimaging studies
and not for panel neuroimaging data. We find this critique of the current practice
in neuroimaging studies equally compelling as a critique of the current statistical
practice in neuroeconomic studies of revealed preferences for risk and ambiguity. To
this end, we propose a marginal longitudinal model of revealed preferences for risk
and ambiguity, where for each subject the covariates in each trial are the payoffs of
the ambiguous lottery and the payoffs and probabilities of payoffs of the risky lottery.
Two of the frequently used models for discrete repeated measurements of ex-
perimental outcomes are: mixed effects models, used extensively in econometrics to
estimate individual specific parameters, and marginal models, where the regression
coefficients are population parameters of subgroups. For a lucid discussion of the rel-
ative merits and limitations of the two approaches we recommend the lecture notes
of Fitzmaurice published in power point on the internet under the title: Applied
Longitudinal Analysis: Contrasting Marginal and Mixed Effects Models.
General estimating equations or  is a widely used methodology in biostatistics
for estimating the population-specific parameters in a marginal model. The 
approach has a number of appealing properties for estimation of the regression coef-
ficients in marginal models. First, we need only make assumptions on the first two
moments of the distribution of the vector of responses. The  estimates of the
regression coefficients are consistent and asymptotically normal, where the covariance
matrix is consistently estimated using a sandwich estimator, even if the within sub-
ject associations among the repeated measurements have been misspecified. In many
cases,  is almost as efficient as maximum likelihood estimation. We interpret
the parameters in the marginal model as population averages in a given group.
There is an important difference between the application of longitudinal analysis
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to neuroimaging data, where the within-subject association of responses is considered
a nuisance and our application of longitudinal analysis. In our experiment, subjects
make a sequence of binary choices between risky and ambiguous binary lotteries. For
paired binary data, Lipsitz et al. (1991) introduced odds ratios as a measure of the
within-subject association of binary responses. We use alternating logistic regression
(), as proposed by Carey et al. (1993), with constant log odds ratios () as
the within-subject association of responses in each phase of the sequence of binary
choices to estimate the regression equations for both the first and second moments
of the marginal model. In  the within-subject association of responses is not a
nuisance for our model, but an essential part of the longitudinal analysis. It is the
within-subject association of responses as log odds that allows us to test for fictive
learning in the revealed preferences derived from the dependent, clustered responses
of subjects.
We define fictive learning for each group as statistically significant changes in
the responses of subjects before and after exposure to in the learning phase of the
experiment. In each group, we estimate a constant () of the odds of choosing the
risky lottery in a trial in the post-learning phase, conditional on the choice in a trial
in the pre-learning phase. Our null hypotheses is the absence of fictive learning in the
learning phase for each group. For the treatment group, we reject the null hypothesis
that the , is zero, i.e., there is fictive learning in the learning phase. This finding
is significant at the 1% level. The significant fictive learning in the treatment group,
given the sample data in the learning phase is as expected. The surprising finding
in our experiment is that we also reject the null hypothesis that the between
trials in the pre and post learning phases in the control group, is also zero, i.e.,
there is fictive learning in the learning phase for the control group. We expected no
fictive learning for the control group. Again the finding is significant at the 1% level.
A possible but problematic explanation of the choice behavior of the control group
is apophenia: “seeing meaningful patterns in meaningless or random data.” For an
evolutionary rational of this type of behavior, see Shermer’s article “Patternicity:
Finding Meaningful Patterns in Meaningless Noise” in Scientific American
(2008).
Whatever subjects in the two groups “learn” in the treatment phase, we can ask
if the effects of the treatments are significantly different between groups. To compare
the effects of the treatment phase in each group, we use the log-odds-ratio test pro-
posed in chapter 10 of Fleiss et al. (2004). The analysis begins with the calculation of
whatever the subjects in the two groups “learn” from the treatment phase, then we
ask if the effects of the two treatments are significantly different. The null hypothesis
is that the , between trials in the pre and post learning phases, in the treatment
group and the , between trials in the pre and post learning phases, in the control
group are equal. We reject the null at the 1% level. That is, the fictive learning in the
two groups produced significantly different choices in the post learning phase relative
to the choices in the pre-learning phase. See the working paper for details. A more
dramatic illustration of the different effects of fictive learning in the two groups are
the box plots in figure 1. That is, if we plot the amount of time where the ambiguous
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lottery is chosen in each phase of the experiment then the curve is a piece-wise linear




To test for the presence of fictive learning in revealed preferences for risk and ambigu-
ity, we propose an experiment on revealed preferences for choices under uncertainty,
consisting of 36 Yale undergraduates as subjects randomly chosen from the 2011 Yale
Fall term. Each subject makes a sequence of 100 binary choices between risky and
ambiguous lotteries. Risky lotteries are defined as lotteries where the relative fre-
quencies of outcomes are known. Ambiguous lotteries are lotteries where the relative
frequencies of outcomes are unknown.
The experiment is divided into three phases. Subjects face the same sequence of
30 binary choices between risky and ambiguous lotteries in the first and third phase
of the experiment. That is, the trials in phase 1 and phase 3 are clustered matched-
pairs, but the lotteries in phase 1 and 3 for the two groups are independent. To
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test for fictive learning, we reveal to each subject the outcomes of her 40 actual and
counterfactual choices in phase 2 In the treatment group, the relative frequencies
of counterfactual ambiguous outcomes in phase 2 are relatively easy to learn, using
sample averages of the outcomes of the ambiguous lotteries. In the control group,
the relative frequencies of counterfactual ambiguous outcomes in phase 2 are quite
difficult, if not impossible, to learn, since the sample averages do not converge. See
the working paper for a formal proof. The binary choices in phase 2 are the same in
both groups and independent of the binary choices in phases 1 and 3 Subjects are
unaware that they will be exposed to counterfactual outcomes in phase 2 before they
are presented binary choices in phase 3. In particular, subjects do not know if the
relative frequencies of outcomes of ambiguous lotteries in phase 2 is a sample average
of the probabilities of ambiguous outcomes in phase 1 and 3. In fact, they are in the
treatment group, but not in the control group.
No outcomes are revealed to subjects in the first and third phase of the experi-
ments. The lotteries are displayed as pie graphs on each subject’s computer screen.
Probabilities for the risky lotteries are displayed. The probabilities determining the
payoffs of ambiguous lotteries are constant in phase 1 and phase 3 of both exper-
iments, but never revealed to the subjects. We randomly vary the placement and
colors of the lotteries on the computer screen to control for positional bias. We ran-
domly choose one group of 17 students from the 36 students as the treatment group.
At the end of the experiment, a trial is randomly chosen for each subject and the
subject is given the payoff of her choice.
We define fictive learning for each group as statistically significant changes in
the responses of subjects before and after exposure to outcomes in phase 2 of the
experiment. In each group, we estimate a constant log odds ratio () of the odds
of choosing the risky lottery in a trial in phase , conditional on the choice in a trial
in phase . We use  in  with the  option to estimate the
regression equations for both the first and second moments of the marginal model.
We assume the  is constant in phase 1; phase 2; phase 3; between phases 1 and
2; between phases 1 and 3 and between phases 2 and 5. In , the odds ratio for
each pair of trials is
(  = 1;  = 1)(  = 0;  = 0)






where  is the subject index and  and  are the indices of the trials.  = 1 means
subject  choose the risky lottery in trial .
The recruiting poster and informed consent form are attached as appendices.
3 A Marginal Analysis of Fictive Learning
In Ellsberg’s well-known two-color paradox (1961), where the risky and the ambiguous
urn have the same payoffs, optimistic subjects choose the ambiguous urn, where
the relative proportions of the black and white balls are unknown, and pessimistic
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subjects choose the risky urn, where the relative proportions of the black and white
balls are known. Recently, Bracha and Brown (2012) introduced affective utilities
where optimistic subjects are endowed with a convex affective utility function and
pessimistic subjects are endowed with a concave affective utility function. In their
model  is a proxy for risk-aversion and  is a proxy for ambiguity-aversion. The
concavity (convexity) of the utility functions in this class of non-expected utility
functions depends on the ratio of  and  In our model we restrict attention to the
parametric class of linear-quadratic concave (convex) utility functions introduced by
Rockafellar (1987).
This is the technical section of the working paper and we limit our exposition to
a discussion of the results and refer the reader to the working paper for technical
details, such as proofs. We denote risky lotteries as  and ambiguous lotteries as  ,
where
 ≡ (1 2;1 2) and  ≡ (1 2)
Subjects evaluate risky lotteries, , using expected utility:
(()) ≡ 1(1) + 2(2)
where the Bernoulli utility function.


() ≡  + 
2




(1) = 1 +

2













Subjects evaluate ambiguous lotteries,  , using affective utility:






In the parametric specification of ( ), the affective utility of the ambiguous
lottery  ,  is the proxy for risk-aversion and  is the proxy for ambiguity-aversion
In each binary choice between a risky and an ambiguous lottery, we assume that
subjects choose the lottery that maximizes random utility, where the parametric
nonrandom components of the random utility of a risky and an ambiguous lottery
are (()) and ( ). These are linear-quadratic multivariate functions.
The important technical aspect of the linear-quadratic formulation is that for any pair
of risky and ambiguous lotteries, the difference in the expected utility of the risky
lottery and the affective utility of the ambiguous lottery is linear in the parameters.
The binary discrete choice model is a generalized linear model where the link function
is a cdf. In this paper, the link function is the logistic cdf. The argument of the link
function is the difference of the parametric nonrandom components of the random
utility of a risky and an ambiguous lottery. If the nonrandom component of the
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random utility function is linear in the parameters, then the log-likelihood is strictly
concave in the parameters defining the nonrandom components of the random utility
function.
Φ( ) the argument of the logistic cdf, is the difference of the expected
utility of the risky lottery  = (1 2;1 2) and the affective utility of the ambigu-
ous lottery  = (1 2). Hence the choice probability for , ( ) is




Φ( ) ≡ log ( )
1− ( ) = [(())− (( ))]
is the log-odds of choosing 
[(())− (( ))]


















(1 + exp[()− (( ))])
( ) is the explicit probability of choosing the risky lottery  in the
pair-wise comparison between the risky lottery  and the ambiguous lottery  . In
each experiment, let  = 1 if the risky lottery is chosen by subject  in trial  and
0 otherwise, then the density of  is
[( )]
 [1− ( )]1−
We estimate the regression parameters for each phase of the experiment:
 ≡ (1 2 3;1 2 3;123;123) ∈ 12
in the marginal model, using generalized estimating equations (). Our pri-
mary reference is the monograph on applied longitudinal analysis by Fitzmaurice et
al. (2011). See the working paper for details.
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Table 1. Analysis of GEE Parameter Estimates: Treatment Group
Standard 95% confidence
Estimates error limits  Pr  ||
1 21074 03118 14863 27186 676  00001
2 14113 02397 09416 18810 589  00001
3 17255 02616 12127 22383 659  00001
1 −00955 00172 −01292 −00617 −554  00001
2 −00507 00125 −00752 −00261 −404  00001
3 −00697 00150 −00992 −00402 −464  00001
1 08134 01418 05355 10914 574  00001
2 06000 01217 03615 08385 493  00001
3 06250 01303 03695 08804 480  00001
1 −00206 00072 −00347 −00065 −287  00041
2 −00103 00068 −00236 00030 −151  01300
3 −00090 00071 −00229 00048 −128  02016
Table 2. Analysis of GEE Parameter Estimates: Control Group
Standard 95% confidence
Estimates error limits  Pr  ||
1 16809 03058 10815 22803 550  00001
2 14511 02580 09454 19568 562  00001
3 14122 03367 07513 20711 419  00001
1 −00661 00156 −00966 −00355 −424  00001
2 −00525 00147 −00813 −00238 −358  00003
3 −00526 00172 −00863 −00189 −306  00022
1 07642 01503 04697 10587 509  00001
2 06261 01408 03501 09022 445  00001
3 00587 01821 02117 09256 312  00018
1 −00195 00080 −00351 −00039 −244  00145
2 −00134 00083 −00296 00028 −162  01055
3 −00094 00099 −00287 00100 −095  03442
In the working paper, we show that the estimated parameter values are consistent
with the concavity and monotonicity of the Bernoulli utilities of wealth and consistent
with the convexity and monotonicity of the affective utility for each group. That is,
both the treatment group and the control group are (on average) risk-averse, but
both groups are (on average) optimistic.
The odds ratio in  is
(  = 1;  = 1)(  = 0;  = 0)






(  = 1;  = 1)(  = 0;  = 0)








where  is the subject index and  and  are the indices of the trials.  = 1 means
the subject choose the risky lottery in trial . We assume the  is constant in
phase 1; phase 2; phase 3; between phases 1 and 2; between phases 1 and 3 and
between phases 2 and 5. In the following tables for the treatment and control groups,
the estimated constant  are denoted Alpha  for  = 1 2  5. We test the null
hypothesis 0: the log odds ratio is equal to zero, against the alternative hypothesis
: the log odds ratio is unequal to zero. Here are the estimates for the log-odds
ratios.
Table 3. Analysis of GEE Parameter Estimates: LOR for the Treatment Group
Standard 95% confidence
Estimates error limits  Pr  ||
1 (Phase 1) −00096 00468 −01013 00822 −020 08381
2 (Phase 2) 01124 00641 −00132 02380 175 00796
3 (Phase 3) 00334 00379 −01077 00408 −088 03778
4 (Phase 1 & 2) 00208 00376 −00529 00944 055 05803
5 (Phase 1 & 3) 01057 00389 00293 01820 271 00067
6 (Phase 2 & 3) 00112 00454 −00778 01003 025 08046
Table 4. Analysis of GEE Parameter Estimates: LOR for the Control Group
Standard 95% confidence
Estimates error limits  Pr  ||
1 (Phase 1) 01217 00744 −00242 02675 164 01020
2 (Phase 2) −00463 00222 −00898 −00027 −208 00374
3 (Phase 3) 01349 00832 −00282 02980 162 01050
4 (Phase 1 & 2) −00061 00304 −00656 00535 −020 08420
5 (Phase 1 & 3) 02051 00779 00525 03577 263 00084
6 (Phase 2 & 3) −00239 00303 −00833 00356 −079 04315
Alpha 2 and Alpha 5 are the only significant statistics in each group. The 
in phase 2 of the control group
(  = 1 |   = 0)
(  = 0 |   = 0) 
(  = 1 |   = 1)
(  = 0 |   = 1)
and the  in phase 2 of the treatment group is
(  = 1 |   = 1)
(  = 0 |   = 1) 
(  = 1 |   = 0)
(  = 0 |   = 0) 
For Alpha 5, the  between phase 1 and phase 3 in each experiment is
(  = 1 |   = 1)
(  = 0 |   = 1) 
(  = 1 |   = 0)
(  = 0 |   = 0) 
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If you want to try your luck, don’t go to Foxwoods. Join us 

















 NOT  be  taking  a  course  from  Professor  Donald  Brown  or  Professor  Laurie 
Santos in the fall term 2011. 
 























study  will  not  benefit  you  personally,  we  hope  that  our  results  will  add  to  the 
knowledge about sequential decision‐making under risk and ambiguity. 
  
This  is  a  75‐minute  experiment  where  you  will  be  asked  to  make  100  pair‐wise 
choices between lotteries with two outcomes. In some lotteries you will be told the 



















If  you  have  any  questions  about  this  study,  you  may  contact  the  investigator, 
Professor  Donald  Brown  at  donald.brown@yale.edu.  If  you  would  like  to  talk  to 
someone  other  than  the  researchers  to  discuss  problems  or  concerns,  to  discuss 
situations  in  the  event  that  a member  of  the  research  team  is  not  available,  or  to 
discuss your  rights as a  research participant,  you may  contact  the Yale University 
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